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Abstract
Recently, Pissarides (2009) has argued that the standard search
model with sunk fixed matching costs increases unemployment volatility
without introducing an unrealistic wage response in new matches. We
revise the role of matching costs and show that when these costs are not
sunk and, therefore, can be partially passed on to new hired workers in
the form of lower wages, the amplification mechanism of fixed matching
costs is considerably reduced and wages in new hired positions become
more sensitive to productivity shocks.
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1 Introduction
The Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search and matching model (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 1985, 2000) studies the dynamics of unemploy-
ment in an environment where jobs are continuously created and destroyed.
A sequence of papers by Costain and Reiter (2008), Hall (2005) and Shimer
(2005) have questioned the model’s ability to match the observed cyclical fluc-
tuations of the unemployment rate in the U.S. For example, Shimer shows
that under a reasonable calibration strategy, the MP model predicts that the
vacancy-unemployment ratio and the average labor productivity should have
nearly the same volatility. In contrast, the standard deviation of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio in the U.S. is almost 20 times as large as the standard
deviation of average labor productivity. This large discrepancy between the
volatility implied by the model and the data constitutes an empirical puzzle,
known as the unemployment volatility puzzle.
Pissarides (2009) shows that introducing fixed matching costs into the
model (e.g., training costs) can significatively increase the volatility of labor-
market outcomes, such as tightness and the job finding rate. He points out
that this result is obtained without inducing a counterfactually low volatility
in the wages of new jobs. In his quantitative exercise, Pissarides only consid-
ers sunk fixed matching costs. That is, “they are sunk once the wage bargain
is concluded and the worker takes up the position”. He shows that when
these costs increase from zero to 40 percent of average labor productivity, the
volatility of the vacancies-unemployment ratio (measured by its elasticity) in-
creases almost twofold, and it matches the observed volatility in the U.S. labor
market. He also argues that non-sunk fixed training costs play a similar role.
In this paper we evaluate the amplification mechanism of non-sunk fixed
matching costs, and examine whether the cyclical volatility predicted by the
model is substantially augmented. We show that when these costs are not sunk
2
and, therefore, can be partially passed on to workers through lower wages, the
volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is approximately an order of
magnitude less responsive to variations in these costs. Thus, from a quantita-
tive standpoint, the contribution of fixed matching costs in explaining labor
market volatility depends not only on the level, but also on what proportion
of these costs is sunk. Moreover, we observe that non-sunk fixed matching
costs may also introduce a significative change in the volatility of wages of
new hired workers.
2 The model
Given that our model is essentially the same as Pissarides’ (2009), its presen-
tation is reduced to a minimum. In this economy, there is a continuum of
risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers and firms which discounts future payoffs
at a common rate r; capital markets are perfect; and time is continuous.
There is a time-consuming and costly process of matching workers and job
vacancies, captured by a standard constant-returns-to-scale matching function
m(u, v) = mou
ηv1−η, where u denotes the unemployment rate, v is the vacancy
rate, and η and mo are the function parameters. Unemployed workers find
jobs at the rate f(θ) = m(u, v)/u, and vacancies are filled at the rate q(θ) =
m(u, v)/v, where θ = v/u denotes labor market tightness. From the properties
of the matching function, the higher the number of vacancies with respect to
the number of unemployed workers, the easier it is to find a job, f ′(θ) > 0,
and the more difficult it is to fill up vacancies, q′(θ) < 0.
A job can be either filled or vacant. Before a position is filled, the firm has
to open a job vacancy with a flow cost c. Firms have a linear technology with
labor as the only production factor. Each filled job yields instantaneous profit
equal to the difference between labor productivity p and the wage. When the
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worker arrives, the firm pays fixed costs H which is sunk. Moreover, it pays
non-sunk fixed costs T right after both the firm and the worker agree to start
a working relationship. A job remains “new” until a shock with arrival rate
λ hits the match and changes its status to a continuing job. In that case,
the worker and the firm renegotiate wages. Notice that T becomes sunk after
the initial negotiation. Therefore, new and continuing jobs will have different
wages wn and wc, respectively. Thus, the value of vacancies V , the value of
a new job Jn, and the value of a continuing job J c are represented by the
following Bellman equations:
rV = −c+ q(θ)(Jn −H − T − V ), (1)
rJn = p− wn + s(V − Jn) + λ(J c − Jn), (2)
rJ c = p− wc + s(V − J c), (3)
When finding a job, the unemployed worker first belongs to a new job.
At rate λ, it becomes a continuing job. All employed workers separate from
their firm at the constant rate s. Unemployed and employed workers’ Bellman
equations are given by
rU = z + f(θ)(W n − U), (4)
rW n = wn + s(U −W n) + λ(W c −W n), (5)
rW c = wc + s(U −W c), (6)
where z represents the flow utility from leisure.
As is standard, we assume that there is free entry for vacancies. Therefore,
in equilibrium:
V = 0. (7)
We also assume that wages in new jobs are determined through bilateral
Nash bargaining between the worker and the firm. The first-order conditions
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for entrant employees yield the following equation:
(1− β)(W n − U) = β(Jn − T ), (8)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the workers’ bargaining power relative to firms’. Note
that the Nash condition depends on matching costs T but not H because the
former are not sunk to new jobs, and therefore they are explicitly considered
in the wage negotiation with new entrants.
This sharing rule implies that Jn−T = (1−β)Sn, where Sn = Jn +W n−
U − T is the surplus of a new job (net of sunk cost H). Using all the value
functions (1)-(6) and the zero-profit condition (7), we obtain the equilibrium
job creation condition
(1− β)(p− z)− β(cθ + f(θ)H)
r + s
=
c
q(θ)
+H + (1− β)T. (9)
As Pissarides (2009) points out, this job creation condition is independent
of the specific wage determination scheme for continuing jobs. If, in particular,
we assume a Nash wage rule for continuing matches as well, we obtain the
following equilibrium wages:
wn = (1− β)z + β(cθ + p+ f(θ)H − (r + s+ λ)T ), (10)
wc = (1− β)z + β(cθ + p+ f(θ)H). (11)
Since H are sunk, they increase the implicit bargaining power of all workers
and, therefore, their wages. In contrast, firms can pass on part of the non-sunk
matching costs T to new employees in the form of lower wages.
A steady-state equilibrium in this economy is a triplet of labor market
tightness and wage rates (θ∗, wn∗, wn∗) that solves equations (9), (10), and
(11) for the steady-state productivity level p∗.
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3 Parameter values and elasticities
For comparative purposes, we use the same targets and parameter values as in
Pissarides (2009), and calibrate the model at monthly frequency without fixed
matching costs, T = H = 0 (benchmark). We calibrate the job conversion
rate λ by assuming that “new” jobs are converted to continuing jobs at the
end of the training period. According to Barron Berger and Black (1997), a
new hired worker becomes fully trained after 20.2 weeks on average. Thus, the
average duration of a new job is 5.1 months, so λ = 0.196 (i.e., 1/λ = 5.1).
Notice that the value of λ is irrelevant when T = 0. See Table 1 for all the
parameter values of our benchmark calibration.
The quantitative exercise we carry out in this section is very simple. We
increase either the sunk (H) or non-sunk (T ) matching costs and adjust the
free vacancy parameter c in order to maintain the same steady-state value for
the labor market tightness θ∗ and, therefore, the equilibrium unemployment
rate u∗ = s
s+f(θ∗) .
1
The central question in this paper is whether this extended MP match-
ing model with fixed matching costs can explain the size of the business cy-
cle fluctuations in labor-market tightness and unemployment given the sep-
aration rate. To explore this issue, we find the elasticities of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio, εθ, and wages in new jobs, εwn , with respect to labor
productivity p. Thus, from the job creation condition (9) and the wage equa-
tions (10), we obtain
εθ =
1
η
[
(1− β)p∗
(1− β)(p∗ − z) + β 1−η
η
cθ∗ − [r + s+ β 1−2η
η
f(θ∗)]H − (r + s)(1− β)T
]
,
(12)
and
εwn = β
[
p∗ + εθ (cθ∗ + f(θ∗)(1− η)H)
wn∗
]
. (13)
1As robustness check of this experiment, later on we calibrate c and β differently.
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Table 2 shows these elasticities for different values of H and T . We find
that the volatility of the vacancies-unemployment ratio θ is much higher when
sunk fixed matching costs H are increased. For example, the elasticity of
the vacancies-unemployment ratio is multiplied almost by two (from 3.67 to
7.24) when these costs increase from 0 to 40 percent of the average labor
productivity. In contrast, this elasticity increases only by 5.72 percent (from
3.67 to 3.88) for the same variation in the non-sunk matching costs T .
To understand this result, notice that there are two effects. There is a direct
effect associated with the terms that depend on H and T in the denominator
of (12). It is easy to see that if η > 1/(r + s + 2), as in our parametrization,
then r + s+ β 1−2η
η
f(θ∗) > (r + s)(1− β) and, consequently, an increase in H
has a larger positive impact on εθ. Furthermore, we have an indirect effect
through the recalibration of parameter c as explained above. Note that an
increase in H causes θ∗ to fall more compared to the impact of T . Therefore,
in order to keep θ∗ constant, c has to fall more when H increases. Clearly, εθ
is decreasing in c. Thus, the indirect effect of a change in fixed matching costs
on εθ through c is larger for H. Provided that η > 1/(r + s+ 2), both effects
are bigger in the case of a change in H, which explains why εθ increases more
when we raise H.
The question now is to what extent each effect contributes to this result.
To assess the size the direct effect we let c at its benchmark value and adjust
θ∗ in order to satisfy equilibrium condition (9). The difference between both
resulting elasticities (again, one recalibrating c and the other letting θ adjust)
can be interpreted as the magnitude of the indirect effect. After all, θ∗ would
inevitably change if we keep the remaining parameters constant when fixed
costs change. In our alternative exercise, it turns out that the resulting elas-
ticities are in most cases very close to the ones where we change c (see last
column of Table 2). For instance, for H = 0.1 or T = 0.1, we obtain εθ|c=.356
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equal to 4.191 and 3.719, respectively. In this case, the real indirect effect is
quite small, actually negative. This remains to be the case for other values
of T . For H ≥ 0.2, this indirect effect actually becomes positive but it is
arguably small relative to the overall change in εθ. Therefore, we can say that
our results do not hinge on our particular way of recalibrating the model.
Notice that in Table 2 we obtain very different values of c. In particular,
when we change H. One question one might want to ask is whether this
calibrated values of c are reasonable. We argue that lower values of c are
in line with the empirical evidence. Using information reported by Barron,
Berger and Black (1997) that comes from the 1982 Employer Opportunity
Pilot Project (EOPP), a cross-sectional firms-level survey containing detailed
information on these labor turnover costs, and Dolfin (2006), Silva and Toledo
(2009) shows that hiring costs represent 12.9% of the monthly wage of a new
hired worker. In the benchmark calibration without fixed costs, hiring costs
represents about 35% of the wage.
Table 3 presents the simulated results when the hiring costs parameter c
is calibrated so that it represents 12.9% of the monthly wage of a new hired
worker. This exercise requires to adjust a different parameter to satisfy the
same equilibrium unemployment rate. We choose the worker bargaining power
β. The simulated elasticities are somewhat similar to the ones shown in Ta-
ble 2. Thus, the conclusions we draw from this alternative experiment are
fundamentally the same.
Now that we understand that sunk fixed costs are crucial to amplify the
shocks, the next question should be focused on the size of sunk and non-sunk
fixed costs from the data. Under the assumption that H and T only capture
training costs, we find that this source of labor turnover costs is able to match
the unemployment volatility if about 36% of them are sunk. We reach this
figure as follows. First, we look at some empirical findings regarding on-
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the-job training in the U.S. Barron et al. (1997), using the EOPP survey,
find that 95% of new hired workers received some kind of training and spent,
on average, 142 hours in training activities during the first quarter in the
firm.2 When adding the contribution of incumbent workers and supervisors in
training new employees, which is placed at 87.5 hours on average, the resulting
cost amounts to 55% of the quarterly wage of a new hire.3 Thus, given our
assumption that H and T only reflect training costs, H + T = .55× 3× wn∗.
Then, we set H and T such that this last equation is satisfied as well as
the model matches the observed θ elasticity of 7.56 in the U.S. reported by
Pissarides (2009). As is shown in the last row of Table 3, we get H = 0.524 and
T = 0.921 (i.e., H/H+T = 0.363), which implies wn∗ = 0.873. However, under
this scenario, wages in new matches are about 12.3% more sensitive to labor
productivity shocks than in the data. This elasticity is somewhat above the
near-proportionality between wages in new matches and labor productivity
estimated in Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) as well as in Pissarides
(2009).
Now we ask whether this ratio of sunk to non-sunk training costs is consis-
tent with the empirical evidence. This ratio can be approximated indirectly
by looking at the wage response of new hired workers to training costs. When
these costs are non-sunk (T ), the worker pays the costs by accepting a lower
wage during the training period as it can be shown in equation (10). In con-
trast, when these costs are sunk, the firm pays for the training process and
the wage of the new hired worker is increased proportionally to H. Most of
the empirical studies have either failed to find a significant negative relation-
2Using a more recent survey, the 1992 Small Business Administration survey, they report
a similar number of hours spent on on-the-job training during the first three months of
employment (150 hours).
3For more information, see Table 1 in Silva and Toledo (2009).
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ship between training and starting wages or find a very small negative effect.4
Along this line, in order for the model to be consistent with this empirical
findings, and predict a (nearly) neutral effect of training costs on the wage
(10), it is necessary that f(θ∗)H = (r + s + λ)T . Thus, given f(θ∗) = 0.594,
r = 0.004, s = 0.036 and λ = 0.196, then H
T
= (r+s+λ)
f(θ)
= 0.397. This ratio is
somewhat similar to the ratio of 0.363 found above which, again, is required to
reproduce the observed elasticity in labor market tightness when vacancy and
training costs account for 13 and 55 percent of the quarterly wage of a new
hire, respectively. Summarizing, from an empirical perspective, it seems that
not only the magnitude of the fixed costs are important but also the size of
sunk costs relative to non-sunk costs as an amplification mechanism of shocks.
4 Conclusion
In a recent paper, Pissarides (2009) argues that the presence of fixed matching
costs can improve the volatility of unemployment maintaining the one-to-one
response of wages to productivity fluctuations observed in the data. In his
model, the matching costs are sunk, so new matched workers take actions
directed to extract the quasi-rents created by them. We show that when these
fixed matching costs can be partially passed on to workers through lower wages,
the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is significatively reduced.
Therefore, it is crucial not only the size of these fixed matching costs but also
the proportion of this costs that are sunk. Moreover, we also observe that
non-sunk fixed matching costs introduce changes in the elasticity of wages of
new hired workers and may violate its proportionality with respect to labor
productivity shocks.
4See for example, Barron et al., 1989; Barron et al., 1999a; Barron et al., 1999b; Holzer,
1990; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; and Veum, 1999.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameter values for the U.S. economy
Parameter Value Source/Target
Labor productivity, p∗ 1 Normalization
Exogenous separation probability, s 0.036 Data (Shimer, 2005)
interest rate, r 0.004 Data
Employment opportunity cost, z 0.71 Hall & Milgrom (2008)
Matching function elasticity, η 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
Matching function scale, mo 0.7 To match the job finding prob.
Workers’ bargaining power, β 0.5 β = η (efficiency)
Cost of vacancy, c 0.356 Solves (9)
Sunk fixed matching costs, H 0 Benchmark
Non sunk fixed matching costs, T 0 Benchmark
Job conversion rate, λ 0.196 To match the average duration of training
Variable
Labor market tightness, θ∗ 0.72 JOLTS
Job finding probability, f(θ∗) 0.594 Shimer (2005)
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Table 2: Short-run effects of sunk vs. non-sunk fixed matching costs
H T c εθ εwn εθ|c=.356
0.00 0 0.356 3.666 0.985 -
0.10 0 0.273 4.183 0.989 4.191
0.20 0 0.191 4.867 0.995 4.757
0.30 0 0.108 5.821 1.000 5.369
0.40 0 0.026 7.238 1.013 6.003
0 0.00 0.356 3.666 0.985 -
0 0.10 0.351 3.717 0.999 3.719
0 0.20 0.346 3.770 1.013 3.773
0 0.30 0.343 3.824 1.023 3.829
0 0.40 0.336 3.880 1.043 3.887
Table 3: Short-run effects of sunk vs. non-sunk fixed matching costs with
targeted hiring costs ( c
wn
= 0.129)
H T β εθ εwn
0.00 0 0.743 3.598 0.995
0.10 0 0.635 4.564 0.996
0.20 0 0.552 5.201 0.998
0.30 0 0.487 5.670 1.000
0.40 0 0.434 6.041 1.003
0 0.00 0.743 3.598 0.995
0 0.10 0.744 3.648 1.014
0 0.20 0.745 3.700 1.034
0 0.30 0.746 3.753 1.054
0 0.40 0.747 3.807 1.075
0.524 0.921 0.352 7.560 1.123
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